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		25X1A CONTENTS	
	по	1. GROMYKO TELLS ASIAN UN DELEGATIONS USSR PREPARED TO USE FORCE IN SYRIA	25X1A
25X1			
			·
	or	5. MOLLET TO TRY TO FORM FRENCH GOVERNMENT	
			25X6
	no	7. TUNISIAN ARMS SITUATION 2	5X1A
:	or	8. YUGOSLAV-ALBANIAN QUARREL THREATENS BELGRADE'S NEW ACCORD WITH SOVIET BLOC	25X1A

23 Oct 57

Current Intelligence Bulletin

25X1A

1. GROMYKO TELLS ASIAN UN DELEGATIONS USSR PREPARED TO USE FORCE IN SYRIA

25X1A	
	Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko on
	20 October concluded a meeting with
	selected UN delegations on the Syrian
	situation by pounding the table and say-
	ing, "The Soviet Union is ready to use
force, accord	ling to an Indonesian delegate who was pres-
	neeting, to which the USSR had invited Soviet
	ian, Indian, Egyptian, and Syrian UN delega

bloc, Indonesian, Indian, Egyptian, and Syrian UN delegations, Gromyko took an extremely stiff line. He ignored virtually every question concerning Soviet motives and objectives in the UN discussion and repeated charges against the United States and Turkey.

Gromyko's remarks, as reported, cannot be taken as a specific indication of Soviet intention to

not be taken as a specific indication of Soviet intention to intervene unilaterally. In his 16 October public statement, Gromyko limited himself to an offer to contribute Soviet forces for a joint UN action, and Soviet spokesmen in private conversations with Western leaders have thus far avoided statements as threatening as those quoted by the Indonesian delegate. Gromyko may have felt, however, that a private reiteration of Soviet allegations against the United States and Turkey would increase the prospects of strong Asian-African support for Syria's complaint in the General Assembly debate. The meeting may have been staged to consolidate Asian neutralist support for the Syrian complaint, as well as to demonstrate to Egypt and Syria the "reality" of Soviet support.

25X1A

23 Oct 57

Next 2 Page(s) In Document Exempt

5. MOLLET TO TRY TO FORM FRENCH GOVERNMENT

25X1A

Socialist leader Guy Mollet's chances of success in his second try to end France's 22-day-old crisis have been markedly enhanced by reported assurances from Independent leader Pinay that the Independent and Peasant party would not vote against him. Mollet's candidacy, which was announced as a

new wave of nationwide strikes were scheduled by both Communist and non-Communist unions for 25 October, may also be favored by the deepening socio-economic crisis.

The cost of living has been climbing at the rate of 1 percent a month and union leaders have been pressed by the rank and file to demand wage increases even though the government is not empowered to act on such demands. The effectiveness of the one-day stoppage on 16 October and the new willingness of foremen and technicians to participate in strikes have probably encouraged labor agitation.

France's financial situation is also worsening. The black-market franc has dropped to 456 to the dollar as compared with the official rate of 420, and there are rumors of further devaluation.

23 Oct 57

Current Intelligence Bulletin

7. TUNISIAN ARMS SITUATION

25X1A

Tunisian President Bourguiba informed Ambassador Jones on 21 October that he is willing to wait for arms from Western sources until a new French government is

formed, providing this does not take "forever." If there are new border violations by the French army, however, he will count on the United States for "quick help."

Bourguiba added that his main problem is to resolve difficulties with Paris and that he does not wish to embarrass France.

French-Tunisian relations have eased somewhat in the past two weeks because of Bourguiba's willingness to negotiate outstanding problems, some minor concessions made by Paris at the insistence of the French ambassador, and the absence of border incidents during this period.

25X1A

8. YUGOSLAV-ALBANIAN QUARREL THREATENS BELGRADE'S NEW ACCORD WITH SOVIET BLOC

25X1A

The sharp Yugoslav reaction to a pamphlet by Albanian Communist boss Hoxha which is critical of the Yugoslav role in Albania's history demonstrates that differences between Belgrade and other Communist cap-

itals continue to threaten the new accord between Yugoslavia and the Soviet bloc. The pamphlet was recently published in the USSR and widely circulated in conjunction with the forthcoming celebration of the 40th anniversary of the October revolution.

Although Belgrade may not relish the resumption of a dispute with Tirana, it has made it clear that despite the new accord with the Soviet bloc, it will not tolerate any direct public criticism of its policies. Yugoslavia's leading paper, Borba, on 20 October accused Hoxha of treating the development of Albanian-Yugoslav relations in his brochure in an "untruthful and biased way." Borba interprets the pamphlet as anti-Yugoslav and concludes that Hoxha is continuing a course which "is opposed to the new spirit in the international workers' movement."

Fundamental suspicions have prevented Albanian-Yugoslav relations from developing any real accord, but Belgrade and Tirana have refrained from exchanging polemics in recent months. A Tirana-Belgrade exchange at this time would detract from any declaration of Yugoslav - Soviet bloc solidarity that Khrushchev may be anticipating in conjunction with the 40th anniversary festivities. A violent editorial by Hoxha which appeared in Moscow's Pravda a year ago ignited the Soviet-Yugoslav controversy which followed the Hungarian revolt.

25X1A

23 Oct 57

Current Intelligence Bulletin